CVE-2003-1035
published 2004-04-15CVE-2003-1035: The default installation of SAP R/3 46C/D allows remote attackers to bypass account locking by using the RFC API instead of the SAPGUI to conduct a brute force…
PriorityP433high7.5CVSS 2.0
AVNACLAuNCPIPAP
EPSS
1.54%
72.2th percentile
The default installation of SAP R/3 46C/D allows remote attackers to bypass account locking by using the RFC API instead of the SAPGUI to conduct a brute force password guessing attack, which does not lock out the account like the SAPGUI does.
Affected
2 ranges
| Vendor | Product | Version range | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| sap | sapgui | — | — |
| sap | sapgui | — | — |
Stop checking back — get the weekly exploitation signal.
Every Monday: what got weaponized or added to CISA KEV in the last seven days — each CVE cross-linked to its PoC, Nuclei template, and detection rule. Free, one email a week, unsubscribe in one click.
No detection rules found.
No public exploits indexed.
No writeups or analysis indexed.
CWE
Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel
mitre_cwe
CWE-288 Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel
CWE-288: Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel
The product requires authentication, but the product has an alternate path or channel that does not require authentication.
Modes of Introduction:
Phase: Architecture and Design
Note: COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Note: This is often seen in web applications that assume that access to a particular CGI program can only be obtained through a "front" screen, when the supporting programs are directly accessible. But this problem is not just in web apps.
Common Consequences:
Scope: Access Control. Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism.
Potential Mitigations:
[Architecture and Design] Funnel all access through a single choke poi
CWE
Unprotected Alternate Channel
mitre_cwe·CVSS 7.5
[HIGH] CWE-420 Unprotected Alternate Channel
CWE-420: Unprotected Alternate Channel
The product protects a primary channel, but it does not use the same level of protection for an alternate channel.
Modes of Introduction:
Phase: Architecture and Design
Note: OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Phase: Implementation
Phase: Operation
Common Consequences:
Scope: Access Control. Impact: Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Bypass Protection Mechanism.
Potential Mitigations:
[Architecture and Design] Identify all alternate channels and use the same protection mechanisms that are used for the primary channels.
Examples:
Register SECURE_ME is located at address 0xF00. A
mirror of this register called COPY_OF_SECURE_ME is
at location 0x800F00. The register SECURE_ME is
http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/2003-March/004039.htmlhttp://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/451378/100/0/threadedhttp://www.securityfocus.com/bid/7007https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/11487http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/2003-March/004039.htmlhttp://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/451378/100/0/threadedhttp://www.securityfocus.com/bid/7007https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/11487
2004-04-15
Published