CVE-2004-0641
published 2004-08-05CVE-2004-0641: Thomson SpeedTouch 510 ADSL Router with firmware GV8BAA3.270, and possibly earlier versions, generates predictable TCP Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs), which…
PriorityP432high7.5CVSS 2.0
AVNACLAuNCPIPAP
EXPLOIT
EPSS
2.61%
83.5th percentile
Thomson SpeedTouch 510 ADSL Router with firmware GV8BAA3.270, and possibly earlier versions, generates predictable TCP Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs), which allows remote attackers to spoof or hijack TCP connections.
Affected
1 ranges
| Vendor | Product | Version range | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| thomson | speedtouch | — | — |
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CWE
Reliance on Security Through Obscurity
mitre_cwe·CVSS 5.0
[MEDIUM] CWE-656 Reliance on Security Through Obscurity
CWE-656: Reliance on Security Through Obscurity
The product uses a protection mechanism whose strength depends heavily on its obscurity, such that knowledge of its algorithms or key data is sufficient to defeat the mechanism.
This reliance on "security through obscurity" can produce resultant weaknesses if an attacker is able to reverse engineer the inner workings of the mechanism. Note that obscurity can be one small part of defense in depth, since it can create more work for an attacker; however, it is a significant risk if used as the primary means of protection.
Modes of Introduction:
Phase: Architecture and Design
Phase: Implementation
Note: REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Common Consequences:
Scope: Confidentiality,
CWE
Violation of Secure Design Principles
mitre_cwe
CWE-657 Violation of Secure Design Principles
CWE-657: Violation of Secure Design Principles
The product violates well-established principles for secure design.
This can introduce resultant weaknesses or make it easier for developers to introduce related weaknesses during implementation. Because code is centered around design, it can be resource-intensive to fix design problems.
Modes of Introduction:
Phase: Architecture and Design
Common Consequences:
Scope: Other. Impact: Other.
Examples:
Switches may revert their functionality to that of hubs when the table used to map ARP information to the switch interface overflows, such as when under a spoofing attack. This results in traffic being broadcast to an eavesdropper, instead of being sent only on the relevant switch interface. To mitigate this type of problem, the developer coul
http://secunia.com/advisories/12238/http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=4299http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=120&type=vulnerabilities&flashstatus=truehttp://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10881https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/16919http://secunia.com/advisories/12238/http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=4299http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=120&type=vulnerabilities&flashstatus=truehttp://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10881https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/16919
2004-08-05
Published