cbcvebase.
CVE-2013-4837
published 2013-11-04

CVE-2013-4837: Unspecified vulnerability in Virtual User Generator in HP LoadRunner before 11.52 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unknown vectors, aka…

PriorityP273critical10CVSS 2.0
AVNACLAuNCCICAC
EXPLOIT
EPSS
62.62%
99.2th percentile
Unspecified vulnerability in Virtual User Generator in HP LoadRunner before 11.52 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unknown vectors, aka ZDI-CAN-1832.

Affected

7 ranges
VendorProductVersion rangeFixed in
hploadrunner<= 11.51—
hploadrunner——
hploadrunner——
hploadrunner——
hploadrunner——
hploadrunner——
hploadrunner——

Detection & IOCsextracted from sources · hover to see the quote

port8080↗
url/ServiceEmulation/services/EmulationAdmin↗
url/webdav↗
commandcopyFileToServer (SOAP method via EmulationAdmin web service)↗
pathC:\windows\system32\null\↗
pathC:\Program Files\HP\LoadRunner↗
otherhttp://service.emulation.ws.mercury.com (SOAP namespace)↗
  • →Detect directory traversal attempts in the copyFileToServer SOAP method by looking for repeated '../' or '..\' sequences in POST bodies to /ServiceEmulation/services/EmulationAdmin. ↗
  • →Alert on HTTP POST requests to /ServiceEmulation/services/EmulationAdmin with Content-Type 'text/xml' and an empty SOAPAction header, which is the exploit's characteristic request pattern. ↗
  • →Fingerprint the vulnerable service by checking for HTTP GET requests to /ServiceEmulation/services/EmulationAdmin?wsdl=1 returning a WSDL containing 'copyFileToServerRequest', which is the exploit's check method. ↗
  • →Monitor for Apache-Coyote/1.1 server banner on port 8080, which is used by the exploit to confirm the target is HP LoadRunner's embedded Tomcat instance. ↗
  • →Watch for JSP file uploads (base64-encoded payloads in SOAP in2 element) followed by GET requests to /ServiceEmulation/<jsp_name>, indicating a webshell drop and execution attempt. ↗
  • ·The traversal depth is configurable (default 3) and can be brute-forced up to 10 levels; detection rules must account for variable numbers of '../' sequences, not just a fixed depth. ↗
  • ·The install path is configurable; the default drop location is C:\Program Files\HP\LoadRunner but attackers may specify a different path, so path-based detections should not rely solely on the default. ↗
  • ·The SOAP in0 element uses a randomized session ID (30000 + rand(30000)), so signature rules should not match on a fixed value for this field. ↗
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