CVE-2017-15012
published 2017-10-13CVE-2017-15012: OpenText Documentum Content Server (formerly EMC Documentum Content Server) through 7.3 does not properly validate the input of the PUT_FILE RPC-command, which…
PriorityP263high8.8CVSS 3.0
AVNACLPRLUINSUCHIHAH
EXPLOIT
EPSS
7.78%
93.9th percentile
OpenText Documentum Content Server (formerly EMC Documentum Content Server) through 7.3 does not properly validate the input of the PUT_FILE RPC-command, which allows any authenticated user to hijack an arbitrary file from the Content Server filesystem; because some files on the Content Server filesystem are security-sensitive, this leads to privilege escalation.
Affected
1 ranges
| Vendor | Product | Version range | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| opentext | documentum_content_server | <= 7.3 | — |
Detection & IOCsextracted from sources · hover to see the quote
- →Detect path traversal in PUT_FILE RPC commands: look for the pattern 'common=/../' or sequences of '/../' in Documentum RPC traffic targeting the PUT_FILE command, which is the core exploit primitive. ↗
- →Monitor Documentum Content Server for PUT_FILE RPC calls that reference filesystem paths outside the docbase storage area, especially paths containing 'dfc.keystore' or shell scripts such as 'dm_set_server_env.sh'. ↗
- →Detect privilege escalation indicator: a session reconnecting as the 'r_install_owner' account using a trusted Identity with a keystore obtained via PUT_FILE path traversal. ↗
- →Monitor for DQL queries of the form 'SELECT FOR READ r_object_id FROM dm_sysobject WHERE r_content_size>0' immediately preceding a PUT_FILE call — the exploit uses this to obtain a valid object ID to attach hijacked content to. ↗
- →Flag use of the CIPHERS string 'ALL:aNULL:!eNULL' in TLS negotiation against Documentum port 10001, which is used by the exploit as a fallback cipher suite for the secure connection path. ↗
- ·The exploit targets the default Documentum Content Server RPC port 10001; installations using non-default ports will not be detected by port-based signatures alone. ↗
- ·The keystore path is dynamically derived from the DOCUMENTUM_SHARED environment variable read out of dm_set_server_env.sh; the hardcoded example path '/u01/documentum/cs/shared/config/dfc.keystore' may differ across installations. ↗
- ·The exploit requires an already-authenticated Documentum session (any valid user); it does not exploit unauthenticated access, so network-layer blocking alone is insufficient if internal users are considered a threat. ↗
CVSS provenance
nvdv3.08.8HIGHCVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvdv2.06.5MEDIUMAV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P
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2017-10-13
Published