CVE-2021-47465
published 2024-05-22CVE-2021-47465: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idle_kvm_start_guest() In commit 10d91611f426…
PriorityP422medium5.5CVSS 3.1
AVLACLPRLUINSUCNINAH
EPSS
0.22%
13.2th percentile
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idle_kvm_start_guest()
In commit 10d91611f426 ("powerpc/64s: Reimplement book3s idle code in
C") kvm_start_guest() became idle_kvm_start_guest(). The old code
allocated a stack frame on the emergency stack, but didn't use the
frame to store anything, and also didn't store anything in its caller's
frame.
idle_kvm_start_guest() on the other hand is written more like a normal C
function, it creates a frame on entry, and also stores CR/LR into its
callers frame (per the ABI). The problem is that there is no caller
frame on the emergency stack.
The emergency stack for a given CPU is allocated with:
paca_ptrs[i]->emergency_sp = alloc_stack(limit, i) + THREAD_SIZE;
So emergency_sp actually points to the first address above the emergency
stack allocation for a given CPU, we must not store above it without
first decrementing it to create a frame. This is different to the
regular kernel stack, paca->kstack, which is initialised to point at an
initial frame that is ready to use.
idle_kvm_start_guest() stores the backchain, CR and LR all of which
write outside the allocation for the emergency stack. It then creates a
stack frame and saves the non-volatile registers. Unfortunately the
frame it creates is not large enough to fit the non-volatiles, and so
the saving of the non-volatile registers also writes outside the
emergency stack allocation.
The end result is that we corrupt whatever is at 0-24 bytes, and 112-248
bytes above the emergency stack allocation.
In practice this has gone unnoticed because the memory immediately above
the emergency stack happens to be used for other stack allocations,
either another CPUs mc_emergency_sp or an IRQ stack. See the order of
calls to irqstack_early_init() and emergency_stack_init().
The low addresses of another stack are the top of that stack, and so are
only used if that stack is under extreme pressue, which essential
Affected
14 ranges
| Vendor | Product | Version range | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| debian | linux | < linux 5.14.16-1 (bookworm) | linux 5.14.16-1 (bookworm) |
| linux | linux | — | — |
| linux | linux | >= 10d91611f426d4bafd2a83d966c36da811b2f7ad < 80bbb0bc3a0288442f7fe6fc514f4ee1cb06ccb7 | 80bbb0bc3a0288442f7fe6fc514f4ee1cb06ccb7 |
| linux | linux | >= 10d91611f426d4bafd2a83d966c36da811b2f7ad < fbd724c49bead048ae9fc1a5b7bff2fb3e54f855 | fbd724c49bead048ae9fc1a5b7bff2fb3e54f855 |
| linux | linux | >= 10d91611f426d4bafd2a83d966c36da811b2f7ad < 6d077c37c4643394b1bae9682da48164fc147ea8 | 6d077c37c4643394b1bae9682da48164fc147ea8 |
| linux | linux | >= 10d91611f426d4bafd2a83d966c36da811b2f7ad < 9b4416c5095c20e110c82ae602c254099b83b72f | 9b4416c5095c20e110c82ae602c254099b83b72f |
| linux | linux_kernel | — | — |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 0 < 5.10.84-1 | 5.10.84-1 |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 0 < 5.14.16-1 | 5.14.16-1 |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 0 < 5.14.16-1 | 5.14.16-1 |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 0 < 5.14.16-1 | 5.14.16-1 |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 5.11 < 5.14.15 | 5.14.15 |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 5.2 < 5.4.156 | 5.4.156 |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 5.5 < 5.10.76 | 5.10.76 |
CVSS provenance
nvdv3.15.5MEDIUMCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
osv5.5MEDIUM
vendor_debian5.5MEDIUM
vendor_redhat5.5MEDIUM
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Red Hat
kernel: KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idle_kvm_start_guest()
vendor_redhat·2024-05-22·CVSS 5.5
CVE-2021-47465 [MEDIUM] CWE-121 kernel: KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idle_kvm_start_guest()
kernel: KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idle_kvm_start_guest()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idle_kvm_start_guest()
In commit 10d91611f426 ("powerpc/64s: Reimplement book3s idle code in
C") kvm_start_guest() became idle_kvm_start_guest(). The old code
allocated a stack frame on the emergency stack, but didn't use the
frame to store anything, and also didn't store anything in its caller's
frame.
idle_kvm_start_guest() on the other hand is written more like a normal C
function, it creates a frame on entry, and also stores CR/LR into its
callers frame (per the ABI). The problem is that there is no caller
frame on the emergency stack.
The emergency stack for a given CPU is allocated with:
paca_ptrs[i]-
Debian
CVE-2021-47465: linux - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: PPC: B...
vendor_debian·2021·CVSS 5.5
CVE-2021-47465 [MEDIUM] CVE-2021-47465: linux - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: PPC: B...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idle_kvm_start_guest() In commit 10d91611f426 ("powerpc/64s: Reimplement book3s idle code in C") kvm_start_guest() became idle_kvm_start_guest(). The old code allocated a stack frame on the emergency stack, but didn't use the frame to store anything, and also didn't store anything in its caller's frame. idle_kvm_start_guest() on the other hand is written more like a normal C function, it creates a frame on entry, and also stores CR/LR into its callers frame (per the ABI). The problem is that there is no caller frame on the emergency stack. The emergency stack for a given CPU is allocated with: paca_ptrs[i]->emergency_sp = alloc_stack(limit, i) + THREAD_SIZE; So emergency_sp actual
OSV
CVE-2021-47465: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idle_kvm_start_guest() In commit 10d916
osv·2024-05-22·CVSS 5.5
CVE-2021-47465 [MEDIUM] CVE-2021-47465: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idle_kvm_start_guest() In commit 10d916
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idle_kvm_start_guest() In commit 10d91611f426 ("powerpc/64s: Reimplement book3s idle code in C") kvm_start_guest() became idle_kvm_start_guest(). The old code allocated a stack frame on the emergency stack, but didn't use the frame to store anything, and also didn't store anything in its caller's frame. idle_kvm_start_guest() on the other hand is written more like a normal C function, it creates a frame on entry, and also stores CR/LR into its callers frame (per the ABI). The problem is that there is no caller frame on the emergency stack. The emergency stack for a given CPU is allocated with: paca_ptrs[i]->emergency_sp = alloc_stack(limit, i) + THREAD_SIZE; So emergency_sp actual
GHSA
GHSA-r7pj-34j8-6jgg: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idle_kvm_start_guest()
In commit 10d9
ghsa_unreviewed·2024-05-22
CVE-2021-47465 [HIGH] CWE-674 GHSA-r7pj-34j8-6jgg: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idle_kvm_start_guest()
In commit 10d9
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idle_kvm_start_guest()
In commit 10d91611f426 ("powerpc/64s: Reimplement book3s idle code in
C") kvm_start_guest() became idle_kvm_start_guest(). The old code
allocated a stack frame on the emergency stack, but didn't use the
frame to store anything, and also didn't store anything in its caller's
frame.
idle_kvm_start_guest() on the other hand is written more like a normal C
function, it creates a frame on entry, and also stores CR/LR into its
callers frame (per the ABI). The problem is that there is no caller
frame on the emergency stack.
The emergency stack for a given CPU is allocated with:
paca_ptrs[i]->emergency_sp = alloc_stack(limit, i) + THREAD_SIZE;
So emergency_sp
No detection rules found.
No public exploits indexed.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d077c37c4643394b1bae9682da48164fc147ea8https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80bbb0bc3a0288442f7fe6fc514f4ee1cb06ccb7https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b4416c5095c20e110c82ae602c254099b83b72fhttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fbd724c49bead048ae9fc1a5b7bff2fb3e54f855https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d077c37c4643394b1bae9682da48164fc147ea8https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80bbb0bc3a0288442f7fe6fc514f4ee1cb06ccb7https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b4416c5095c20e110c82ae602c254099b83b72fhttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fbd724c49bead048ae9fc1a5b7bff2fb3e54f855
2024-05-22
Published