cbcvebase.
CVE-2022-25090
published 2022-03-10

CVE-2022-25090: Printix Secure Cloud Print Management through 1.3.1106.0 creates a temporary temp.ini file in a directory with insecure permissions, leading to privilege…

PriorityP260high8.1CVSS 3.1
AVNACHPRNUINSUCHIHAH
EXPLOIT
EPSS
11.01%
95.3th percentile
Printix Secure Cloud Print Management through 1.3.1106.0 creates a temporary temp.ini file in a directory with insecure permissions, leading to privilege escalation because of a race condition.

Affected

1 ranges
VendorProductVersion rangeFixed in
kofaxprintix<= 1.3.1106.0

Detection & IOCsextracted from sources · hover to see the quote

urlhttps://software.printix.net/client/win/1.3.1106.0/PrintixClientWindows.zip
filenamemsiwrapper.ini
pathC:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Temp\msiwrapper.ini
commandPowerShell -Command "$FilePath='<file>'; Write-Host ((New-Object -COMObject Shell.Application).NameSpace((Split-Path -Parent -Path $FilePath))).ParseName((Split-Path -Leaf -Path $FilePath)).ExtendedProperty('System.Author')"
  • Monitor for creation and rapid modification of msiwrapper.ini in any user's %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\ directory during Printix MSI installer execution — this is the race condition target file for privilege escalation.
  • Detect writes to msiwrapper.ini that modify the 'SetupFileName' key, replacing it with an attacker-controlled payload path — this is the core exploitation step.
  • Alert on enumeration of C:\Windows\Installer\*.msi files combined with PowerShell Shell.Application COM object queries for 'System.Author' property — used by the exploit to locate the Printix installer.
  • Detect spawning of CMD.exe with PowerShell child process iterating over C:\Windows\Installer\ MSI files in a loop — indicative of automated Printix installer discovery for CVE-2022-25090 exploitation.
  • ·The race condition window is very narrow (polling interval is 20ms); detection based on file write timing must account for high-frequency file system events on the temp directory.
  • ·The exploit requires the Printix MSI installer to already be present in C:\Windows\Installer\ and authored by 'Printix'; systems without a prior Printix installation will not be vulnerable to this specific exploit path.
  • ·The exploit is triggered by launching the legitimate Printix MSI installer (Process.Start(trueInstaller)), so process creation of a Printix MSI alone is not sufficient to distinguish malicious from benign activity without correlating concurrent msiwrapper.ini modification.

CVSS provenance

nvdv3.18.1HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvdv2.09.3CRITICALAV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
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