CVE-2023-47641
published 2023-11-14CVE-2023-47641: aiohttp is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Affected versions of aiohttp have a security vulnerability regarding the…
PriorityP337medium6.5CVSS 3.1
AVNACLPRNUINSUCLILAN
EPSS
0.83%
53.4th percentile
aiohttp is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Affected versions of aiohttp have a security vulnerability regarding the inconsistent interpretation of the http protocol. HTTP/1.1 is a persistent protocol, if both Content-Length(CL) and Transfer-Encoding(TE) header values are present it can lead to incorrect interpretation of two entities that parse the HTTP and we can poison other sockets with this incorrect interpretation. A possible Proof-of-Concept (POC) would be a configuration with a reverse proxy(frontend) that accepts both CL and TE headers and aiohttp as backend. As aiohttp parses anything with chunked, we can pass a chunked123 as TE, the frontend entity will ignore this header and will parse Content-Length. The impact of this vulnerability is that it is possible to bypass any proxy rule, poisoning sockets to other users like passing Authentication Headers, also if it is present an Open Redirect an attacker could combine it to redirect random users to another website and log the request. This vulnerability has been addressed in release 3.8.0 of aiohttp. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
Affected
4 ranges
| Vendor | Product | Version range | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| aio-libs | aiohttp | < 3.8.0 | 3.8.0 |
| aiohttp | aiohttp | < 3.8.0 | 3.8.0 |
| aiohttp | aiohttp | >= 0 < 3.8.0 | 3.8.0 |
| debian | python-aiohttp | < python-aiohttp 3.8.1-1 (bookworm) | python-aiohttp 3.8.1-1 (bookworm) |
CVSS provenance
nvdv3.16.5MEDIUMCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
ghsa6.1MEDIUM
osv6.5MEDIUM
vendor_debian3.4LOW
vendor_redhat3.4LOW
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Red Hat
python-aiohttp: inconsistent interpretation of `Content-Length` vs. `Transfer-Encoding`
vendor_redhat·2023-11-14·CVSS 3.4
CVE-2023-47641 [LOW] CWE-444 python-aiohttp: inconsistent interpretation of `Content-Length` vs. `Transfer-Encoding`
python-aiohttp: inconsistent interpretation of `Content-Length` vs. `Transfer-Encoding`
aiohttp is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Affected versions of aiohttp have a security vulnerability regarding the inconsistent interpretation of the http protocol. HTTP/1.1 is a persistent protocol, if both Content-Length(CL) and Transfer-Encoding(TE) header values are present it can lead to incorrect interpretation of two entities that parse the HTTP and we can poison other sockets with this incorrect interpretation. A possible Proof-of-Concept (POC) would be a configuration with a reverse proxy(frontend) that accepts both CL and TE headers and aiohttp as backend. As aiohttp parses anything with chunked, we can pass a chunked123 as TE, the frontend entity will ig
Debian
CVE-2023-47641: python-aiohttp - aiohttp is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. ...
vendor_debian·2023·CVSS 3.4
CVE-2023-47641 [LOW] CVE-2023-47641: python-aiohttp - aiohttp is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. ...
aiohttp is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Affected versions of aiohttp have a security vulnerability regarding the inconsistent interpretation of the http protocol. HTTP/1.1 is a persistent protocol, if both Content-Length(CL) and Transfer-Encoding(TE) header values are present it can lead to incorrect interpretation of two entities that parse the HTTP and we can poison other sockets with this incorrect interpretation. A possible Proof-of-Concept (POC) would be a configuration with a reverse proxy(frontend) that accepts both CL and TE headers and aiohttp as backend. As aiohttp parses anything with chunked, we can pass a chunked123 as TE, the frontend entity will ignore this header and will parse Content-Length. The impact of this vulnerability is that
GHSA
Aiohttp has inconsistent interpretation of `Content-Length` vs. `Transfer-Encoding` differing in C and Python fallbacks
ghsa·2023-11-14·CVSS 6.1
CVE-2023-47641 [MEDIUM] CWE-444 Aiohttp has inconsistent interpretation of `Content-Length` vs. `Transfer-Encoding` differing in C and Python fallbacks
Aiohttp has inconsistent interpretation of `Content-Length` vs. `Transfer-Encoding` differing in C and Python fallbacks
### Impact
Aiohttp has a security vulnerability regarding the inconsistent interpretation of the http protocol. As we know that HTTP/1.1 is persistent, if we have both Content-Length(CL) and Transfer-Encoding(TE) it can lead to incorrect interpretation of two entities that parse the HTTP and we can poison other sockets with this incorrect interpretation.
A possible Proof-of-Concept (POC) would be a configuration with a reverse proxy(frontend) that accepts both CL and TE headers and aiohttp as backend. As aiohttp parses anything with chunked, we can pass a chunked123 as TE, the frontend entity will ignore this header and will parse Content-Length. I can give a Dockerfil
OSV
CVE-2023-47641: aiohttp is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python
osv·2023-11-14·CVSS 6.5
CVE-2023-47641 [MEDIUM] CVE-2023-47641: aiohttp is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python
aiohttp is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Affected versions of aiohttp have a security vulnerability regarding the inconsistent interpretation of the http protocol. HTTP/1.1 is a persistent protocol, if both Content-Length(CL) and Transfer-Encoding(TE) header values are present it can lead to incorrect interpretation of two entities that parse the HTTP and we can poison other sockets with this incorrect interpretation. A possible Proof-of-Concept (POC) would be a configuration with a reverse proxy(frontend) that accepts both CL and TE headers and aiohttp as backend. As aiohttp parses anything with chunked, we can pass a chunked123 as TE, the frontend entity will ignore this header and will parse Content-Length. The impact of this vulnerability is that
OSV
Aiohttp has inconsistent interpretation of `Content-Length` vs. `Transfer-Encoding` differing in C and Python fallbacks
osv·2023-11-14·CVSS 6.1
CVE-2023-47641 [MEDIUM] Aiohttp has inconsistent interpretation of `Content-Length` vs. `Transfer-Encoding` differing in C and Python fallbacks
Aiohttp has inconsistent interpretation of `Content-Length` vs. `Transfer-Encoding` differing in C and Python fallbacks
### Impact
Aiohttp has a security vulnerability regarding the inconsistent interpretation of the http protocol. As we know that HTTP/1.1 is persistent, if we have both Content-Length(CL) and Transfer-Encoding(TE) it can lead to incorrect interpretation of two entities that parse the HTTP and we can poison other sockets with this incorrect interpretation.
A possible Proof-of-Concept (POC) would be a configuration with a reverse proxy(frontend) that accepts both CL and TE headers and aiohttp as backend. As aiohttp parses anything with chunked, we can pass a chunked123 as TE, the frontend entity will ignore this header and will parse Content-Length. I can give a Dockerfil
No detection rules found.
No public exploits indexed.
https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/f016f0680e4ace6742b03a70cb0382ce86abe371https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/security/advisories/GHSA-xx9p-xxvh-7g8jhttps://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/f016f0680e4ace6742b03a70cb0382ce86abe371https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/security/advisories/GHSA-xx9p-xxvh-7g8jhttps://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/02/msg00002.html
2023-11-14
Published