cbcvebase.
CVE-2023-48788
published 2024-03-12

CVE-2023-48788: A improper neutralization of special elements used in an sql command ('sql injection') in Fortinet FortiClientEMS version 7.2.0 through 7.2.2, FortiClientEMS…

PriorityP198critical9.8CVSS 3.1
AVNACLPRNUINSUCHIHAH
KEVITWEXPLOITRansomwareInitial access
CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilitydue 2024-04-15
Exploited in the wild
EPSS
97.59%
99.9th percentile
A improper neutralization of special elements used in an sql command ('sql injection') in Fortinet FortiClientEMS version 7.2.0 through 7.2.2, FortiClientEMS 7.0.1 through 7.0.10 allows attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via specially crafted packets.

Affected

7 ranges
VendorProductVersion rangeFixed in
fortinetforticlient_enterprise_management_server>= 7.0.1 < 7.0.117.0.11
fortinetforticlient_enterprise_management_server>= 7.2.0 < 7.2.37.2.3
fortinetforticlientems
fortinetforticlientems7.0.1 – 7.0.10
fortinetforticlientems7.2.0 – 7.2.2
fortinetforticliententerprisemanagementserver
fortinetfortinet

Detection & IOCsextracted from sources · hover to see the quote

urlhttps://infinity.screenconnect.com/Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe?e=Access&y=Guest
pathC:\update.exe
pathC:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\MSSQL14.FCEMS\MSSQL\Log\ERRORLOG.X
processc:\program files\microsoft sql server\mssql14.fcems\mssql\binn\sqlservr.exe
domainwebhook.site
urlhttps://webhook.site/278fXXXX-ca3b-[REDACTED]-96e4-XXXX45aa6809
filenamenetscan.exe
filenamewebbrowserpassview.exe
filenamenetpass64.exe
filenamemimikatz.exe
filenameHRSword.exe
pathC:\ProgramData\AnyDesk\ad_svc.trace
commandRemove-Item (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath
commandmmc.exe compmgmt.msc /computer:{hostname/ip}
domainfilemail.com
  • Monitor the FortiClient EMS SQL Server error log at C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\MSSQL14.FCEMS\MSSQL\Log\ERRORLOG.X for malformed or unexpected SQL queries indicating injection attempts.
  • Alert on sqlservr.exe (MSSQL14.FCEMS instance) spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe child processes, as this is the direct exploitation chain for CVE-2023-48788.
  • Hunt for curl or certutil downloading files to C:\update.exe followed by execution, as this is the post-exploitation ScreenConnect installer staging pattern.
  • Monitor for outbound PowerShell Invoke-WebRequest (iwr) POST requests to webhook.site, used by the threat actor to beacon from vulnerable FortiClient EMS targets during scanning.
  • Detect presence of HRSword.exe (Huorong Internet Security) on non-Huorong-licensed endpoints, as it was used by attackers for defense evasion post-exploitation.
  • Review AnyDesk trace logs at C:\ProgramData\AnyDesk\ad_svc.trace for attacker-controlled remote IP addresses following FortiClient EMS compromise.
  • Alert on access to administrative shares (C$, IPC$, ADMIN$) and registry hives (HKLM\SAM, HKLM\SECURITY) via Remote Registry service from internal IPs following FortiClient EMS exposure.
  • Track repeated use of the same usernames, passwords, and source endpoint names (e.g., '0DAY-PROJECT', 'kali') across incidents for high-fidelity detection of threat actor reuse patterns linked to CVE-2023-48788 exploitation.
  • Detect SimpleHelp RMM installation following FortiClient EMS exploitation, as threat actors consistently deployed it for persistence after initial access via CVE-2023-48788.
  • ·The FortiClient EMS ems.log and sql_trace.log paths are key forensic artifacts but may not be present on all deployments; sql_trace.log is conditional on SQL tracing being enabled.
  • ·The webhook.site token in observed scanning activity was partially redacted; the specific token value cannot be used as a static IOC, but the pattern of POST beaconing to webhook.site from FortiClient EMS servers is actionable.
  • ·The ScreenConnect installer URL uses a 'Guest' trial license parameter (y=Guest); blocking this specific URL pattern may not catch variants using paid or differently parameterized ScreenConnect deployments.
  • ·The attacker IP identified via AnyDesk logs was located in the Russian region and associated with Cobalt Strike abuse, but the specific IP was not fully disclosed in the report.

CVSS provenance

nvdv3.19.8CRITICALCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
vulncheck9.8CRITICAL
cisa9.8CRITICAL
CVEs like this are exactly what “Exploited This Week” covers.

Every Monday: what got weaponized or added to CISA KEV in the last seven days — each CVE cross-linked to its PoC, Nuclei template, and detection rule. Free, one email a week, unsubscribe in one click.