cbcvebase.
CVE-2023-53024
published 2025-03-27

CVE-2023-53024: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation To mitigate…

PriorityP432high7.1CVSS 3.1
AVLACLPRLUINSUCHINAH
EPSS
0.19%
8.6th percentile
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation To mitigate Spectre v4, 2039f26f3aca ("bpf: Fix leakage due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation") inserts lfence instructions after 1) initializing a stack slot and 2) spilling a pointer to the stack. However, this does not cover cases where a stack slot is first initialized with a pointer (subject to sanitization) but then overwritten with a scalar (not subject to sanitization because the slot was already initialized). In this case, the second write may be subject to speculative store bypass (SSB) creating a speculative pointer-as-scalar type confusion. This allows the program to subsequently leak the numerical pointer value using, for example, a branch-based cache side channel. To fix this, also sanitize scalars if they write a stack slot that previously contained a pointer. Assuming that pointer-spills are only generated by LLVM on register-pressure, the performance impact on most real-world BPF programs should be small. The following unprivileged BPF bytecode drafts a minimal exploit and the mitigation: [...] // r6 = 0 or 1 (skalar, unknown user input) // r7 = accessible ptr for side channel // r10 = frame pointer (fp), to be leaked // r9 = r10 # fp alias to encourage ssb *(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r10 // fp[-8] = ptr, to be leaked // lfence added here because of pointer spill to stack. // // Ommitted: Dummy bpf_ringbuf_output() here to train alias predictor // for no r9-r10 dependency. // *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r6 // fp[-8] = scalar, overwrites ptr // 2039f26f3aca: no lfence added because stack slot was not STACK_INVALID, // store may be subject to SSB // // fix: also add an lfence when the slot contained a ptr // r8 = *(u64 *)(r9 - 8) // r8 = architecturally a scalar, speculatively a ptr // // leak ptr using branch-based cache side channel: r8 &= 1 // choose bit to leak if r8 == 0 goto SLOW // no mispredic

Affected

25 ranges
VendorProductVersion rangeFixed in
debianlinux< linux 6.1.11-1 (bookworm)linux 6.1.11-1 (bookworm)
linuxlinux
linuxlinux
linuxlinux>= 0e9280654aa482088ee6ef3deadef331f5ac5fb0 < da75dec7c6617bddad418159ffebcb133f008262da75dec7c6617bddad418159ffebcb133f008262
linuxlinux>= 2039f26f3aca5b0e419b98f65dd36481337b86ee < 01bdcc73dbe7be3ad4d4ee9a59b71e42f461a52801bdcc73dbe7be3ad4d4ee9a59b71e42f461a528
linuxlinux>= 2039f26f3aca5b0e419b98f65dd36481337b86ee < b0c89ef025562161242a7c19b213bd6b272e93dfb0c89ef025562161242a7c19b213bd6b272e93df
linuxlinux>= 2039f26f3aca5b0e419b98f65dd36481337b86ee < e4f4db47794c9f474b184ee1418f42e6a07412b6e4f4db47794c9f474b184ee1418f42e6a07412b6
linuxlinux>= 4.19.207 < 4.19.2724.19.272
linuxlinux>= 5.10.56 < 5.10.1665.10.166
linuxlinux>= 5.13.8 < 5.145.14
linuxlinux>= 5.4.146 < 5.4.2315.4.231
linuxlinux>= 872968502114d68c21419cf7eb5ab97717e7b803 < aae109414a57ab4164218f36e2e4a17f027fcaaaaae109414a57ab4164218f36e2e4a17f027fcaaa
linuxlinux>= f5893af2704eb763eb982f01d573f5b19f06b623 < 81b3374944d201872cfcf82730a7860f8e7c31dd81b3374944d201872cfcf82730a7860f8e7c31dd
linuxlinux_kernel
linuxlinux_kernel
linuxlinux_kernel>= 0 < 5.10.178-15.10.178-1
linuxlinux_kernel>= 0 < 6.1.11-16.1.11-1
linuxlinux_kernel>= 0 < 6.1.11-16.1.11-1
linuxlinux_kernel>= 0 < 6.1.11-16.1.11-1
linuxlinux_kernel>= 4.19.207 < 4.19.2724.19.272
linuxlinux_kernel>= 5.10.56 < 5.10.1665.10.166
linuxlinux_kernel>= 5.13.8 < 5.145.14
linuxlinux_kernel>= 5.14.1 < 5.15.915.15.91
linuxlinux_kernel>= 5.16 < 6.1.96.1.9
linuxlinux_kernel>= 5.4.146 < 5.4.2315.4.231

CVSS provenance

nvdv3.17.1HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
osv7.1HIGH
vendor_debian7.1HIGH
vendor_redhat7.1HIGH
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