CVE-2023-53188
published 2025-09-15CVE-2023-53188: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: fix race on port output assume the following setup on a single machine…
PriorityP419medium4.7CVSS 3.1
AVLACHPRLUINSUCNINAH
EPSS
0.10%
1.2th percentile
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: fix race on port output
assume the following setup on a single machine:
1. An openvswitch instance with one bridge and default flows
2. two network namespaces "server" and "client"
3. two ovs interfaces "server" and "client" on the bridge
4. for each ovs interface a veth pair with a matching name and 32 rx and
tx queues
5. move the ends of the veth pairs to the respective network namespaces
6. assign ip addresses to each of the veth ends in the namespaces (needs
to be the same subnet)
7. start some http server on the server network namespace
8. test if a client in the client namespace can reach the http server
when following the actions below the host has a chance of getting a cpu
stuck in a infinite loop:
1. send a large amount of parallel requests to the http server (around
3000 curls should work)
2. in parallel delete the network namespace (do not delete interfaces or
stop the server, just kill the namespace)
there is a low chance that this will cause the below kernel cpu stuck
message. If this does not happen just retry.
Below there is also the output of bpftrace for the functions mentioned
in the output.
The series of events happening here is:
1. the network namespace is deleted calling
`unregister_netdevice_many_notify` somewhere in the process
2. this sets first `NETREG_UNREGISTERING` on both ends of the veth and
then runs `synchronize_net`
3. it then calls `call_netdevice_notifiers` with `NETDEV_UNREGISTER`
4. this is then handled by `dp_device_event` which calls
`ovs_netdev_detach_dev` (if a vport is found, which is the case for
the veth interface attached to ovs)
5. this removes the rx_handlers of the device but does not prevent
packages to be sent to the device
6. `dp_device_event` then queues the vport deletion to work in
background as a ovs_lock is needed that we do not hold in the
unregistration path
7. `unregister_netdevice_many_notify` continues to call
`netdev
Affected
18 ranges
| Vendor | Product | Version range | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| debian | linux | < linux 6.1.25-1 (bookworm) | linux 6.1.25-1 (bookworm) |
| linux | linux | — | — |
| linux | linux | >= 7f8a436eaa2c3ddd8e1ff2fbca267e6275085536 < 9b0dd09c1ceb35950d2884848099fccc9ec9a123 | 9b0dd09c1ceb35950d2884848099fccc9ec9a123 |
| linux | linux | >= 7f8a436eaa2c3ddd8e1ff2fbca267e6275085536 < 284be5db6c8d06d247ed056cfc448c4f79bbb16c | 284be5db6c8d06d247ed056cfc448c4f79bbb16c |
| linux | linux | >= 7f8a436eaa2c3ddd8e1ff2fbca267e6275085536 < 5efcb301523baacd98a47553d4996e924923114d | 5efcb301523baacd98a47553d4996e924923114d |
| linux | linux | >= 7f8a436eaa2c3ddd8e1ff2fbca267e6275085536 < 644b3051b06ba465bc7401bfae9b14963cbc8c1c | 644b3051b06ba465bc7401bfae9b14963cbc8c1c |
| linux | linux | >= 7f8a436eaa2c3ddd8e1ff2fbca267e6275085536 < 56252da41426f3d01957456f13caf46ce670ea29 | 56252da41426f3d01957456f13caf46ce670ea29 |
| linux | linux | >= 7f8a436eaa2c3ddd8e1ff2fbca267e6275085536 < 066b86787fa3d97b7aefb5ac0a99a22dad2d15f8 | 066b86787fa3d97b7aefb5ac0a99a22dad2d15f8 |
| linux | linux_kernel | — | — |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 0 < 5.10.237-1 | 5.10.237-1 |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 0 < 6.1.25-1 | 6.1.25-1 |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 0 < 6.1.25-1 | 6.1.25-1 |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 0 < 6.1.25-1 | 6.1.25-1 |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 4.3 < 5.4.293 | 5.4.293 |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 5.11 < 5.15.181 | 5.15.181 |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 5.16 < 6.1.25 | 6.1.25 |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 5.5 < 5.10.237 | 5.10.237 |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 6.2 < 6.2.12 | 6.2.12 |
CVSS provenance
nvdv3.14.7MEDIUMCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
osv4.7MEDIUM
vendor_debian4.7MEDIUM
vendor_redhat4.7MEDIUM
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OSV
CVE-2023-53188: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: fix race on port output assume the following setup on a single m
osv·2025-09-15·CVSS 4.7
CVE-2023-53188 [MEDIUM] CVE-2023-53188: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: fix race on port output assume the following setup on a single m
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: fix race on port output assume the following setup on a single machine: 1. An openvswitch instance with one bridge and default flows 2. two network namespaces "server" and "client" 3. two ovs interfaces "server" and "client" on the bridge 4. for each ovs interface a veth pair with a matching name and 32 rx and tx queues 5. move the ends of the veth pairs to the respective network namespaces 6. assign ip addresses to each of the veth ends in the namespaces (needs to be the same subnet) 7. start some http server on the server network namespace 8. test if a client in the client namespace can reach the http server when following the actions below the host has a chance of getting a cpu stuck in a infinite loop
GHSA
GHSA-j5c6-h3mg-24rj: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: fix race on port output
assume the following setup on a single
ghsa_unreviewed·2025-09-15
CVE-2023-53188 [MEDIUM] CWE-362 GHSA-j5c6-h3mg-24rj: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: fix race on port output
assume the following setup on a single
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: fix race on port output
assume the following setup on a single machine:
1. An openvswitch instance with one bridge and default flows
2. two network namespaces "server" and "client"
3. two ovs interfaces "server" and "client" on the bridge
4. for each ovs interface a veth pair with a matching name and 32 rx and
tx queues
5. move the ends of the veth pairs to the respective network namespaces
6. assign ip addresses to each of the veth ends in the namespaces (needs
to be the same subnet)
7. start some http server on the server network namespace
8. test if a client in the client namespace can reach the http server
when following the actions below the host has a chance of getting a cpu
stuck in a infinite l
Red Hat
kernel: net: openvswitch: fix race on port output
vendor_redhat·2025-09-15·CVSS 4.7
CVE-2023-53188 [MEDIUM] CWE-821 kernel: net: openvswitch: fix race on port output
kernel: net: openvswitch: fix race on port output
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: fix race on port output
assume the following setup on a single machine:
1. An openvswitch instance with one bridge and default flows
2. two network namespaces "server" and "client"
3. two ovs interfaces "server" and "client" on the bridge
4. for each ovs interface a veth pair with a matching name and 32 rx and
tx queues
5. move the ends of the veth pairs to the respective network namespaces
6. assign ip addresses to each of the veth ends in the namespaces (needs
to be the same subnet)
7. start some http server on the server network namespace
8. test if a client in the client namespace can reach the http server
when following the actions below the host has
Debian
CVE-2023-53188: linux - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvs...
vendor_debian·2023·CVSS 4.7
CVE-2023-53188 [MEDIUM] CVE-2023-53188: linux - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvs...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: fix race on port output assume the following setup on a single machine: 1. An openvswitch instance with one bridge and default flows 2. two network namespaces "server" and "client" 3. two ovs interfaces "server" and "client" on the bridge 4. for each ovs interface a veth pair with a matching name and 32 rx and tx queues 5. move the ends of the veth pairs to the respective network namespaces 6. assign ip addresses to each of the veth ends in the namespaces (needs to be the same subnet) 7. start some http server on the server network namespace 8. test if a client in the client namespace can reach the http server when following the actions below the host has a chance of getting a cpu stuck in a infinite loop
No detection rules found.
No public exploits indexed.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/066b86787fa3d97b7aefb5ac0a99a22dad2d15f8https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/284be5db6c8d06d247ed056cfc448c4f79bbb16chttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56252da41426f3d01957456f13caf46ce670ea29https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5efcb301523baacd98a47553d4996e924923114dhttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/644b3051b06ba465bc7401bfae9b14963cbc8c1chttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b0dd09c1ceb35950d2884848099fccc9ec9a123
2025-09-15
Published