CVE-2023-53491
published 2025-10-01CVE-2023-53491: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute Back during the discussion of…
PriorityP425medium5.5CVSS 3.1
AVLACLPRLUINSUCNINAH
EPSS
0.28%
19.9th percentile
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute
Back during the discussion of
commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try")
we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission
of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had
support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fixed in
gcc-11. Now that the function attribute is available, let's start using
it.
Callers of boot_init_stack_canary need to use this function attribute
unless they're compiled with -fno-stack-protector, otherwise the canary
stored in the stack slot of the caller will differ upon the call to
boot_init_stack_canary. This will lead to a call to __stack_chk_fail()
then panic.
Affected
7 ranges
| Vendor | Product | Version range | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| debian | linux | < linux 6.4.4-1 (forky) | linux 6.4.4-1 (forky) |
| linux | linux | — | — |
| linux | linux | >= 420594296838fdc9a674470d710cda7d1487f9f4 < 25e73018b4093e0cfbcec5dc4a4bb86d0b69ed56 | 25e73018b4093e0cfbcec5dc4a4bb86d0b69ed56 |
| linux | linux | >= 420594296838fdc9a674470d710cda7d1487f9f4 < 514ca14ed5444b911de59ed3381dfd195d99fe4b | 514ca14ed5444b911de59ed3381dfd195d99fe4b |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 0 < 6.4.4-1 | 6.4.4-1 |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 0 < 6.4.4-1 | 6.4.4-1 |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 2.6.30 < 6.4.4 | 6.4.4 |
CVSS provenance
nvdv3.15.5MEDIUMCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
osv5.5MEDIUM
vendor_debian5.5MEDIUM
vendor_redhat5.5MEDIUM
Stop checking back — get the weekly exploitation signal.
Every Monday: what got weaponized or added to CISA KEV in the last seven days — each CVE cross-linked to its PoC, Nuclei template, and detection rule. Free, one email a week, unsubscribe in one click.
OSV
CVE-2023-53491: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute Back during the discussi
osv·2025-10-01·CVSS 5.5
CVE-2023-53491 [MEDIUM] CVE-2023-53491: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute Back during the discussi
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute Back during the discussion of commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try") we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fixed in gcc-11. Now that the function attribute is available, let's start using it. Callers of boot_init_stack_canary need to use this function attribute unless they're compiled with -fno-stack-protector, otherwise the canary stored in the stack slot of the caller will differ upon the call to boot_init_stack_canary. This will lead to a call to __stack_chk_fail() then panic.
GHSA
GHSA-w4g3-pp54-phhq: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute
Back during the discus
ghsa_unreviewed·2025-10-01
CVE-2023-53491 [MEDIUM] GHSA-w4g3-pp54-phhq: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute
Back during the discus
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute
Back during the discussion of
commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try")
we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission
of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had
support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fixed in
gcc-11. Now that the function attribute is available, let's start using
it.
Callers of boot_init_stack_canary need to use this function attribute
unless they're compiled with -fno-stack-protector, otherwise the canary
stored in the stack slot of the caller will differ upon the call to
boot_init_stack_canary. This will lead to a call to __stack_chk_fail()
then pani
Red Hat
kernel: start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute
vendor_redhat·2025-10-01·CVSS 5.5
CVE-2023-53491 [MEDIUM] CWE-665 kernel: start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute
kernel: start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute
Back during the discussion of
commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try")
we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission
of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had
support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fixed in
gcc-11. Now that the function attribute is available, let's start using
it.
Callers of boot_init_stack_canary need to use this function attribute
unless they're compiled with -fno-stack-protector, otherwise the canary
stored in the stack slot of the caller will differ upon the call to
boot_init_stack_
Debian
CVE-2023-53491: linux - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: start_kerne...
vendor_debian·2023·CVSS 5.5
CVE-2023-53491 [MEDIUM] CVE-2023-53491: linux - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: start_kerne...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute Back during the discussion of commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try") we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fixed in gcc-11. Now that the function attribute is available, let's start using it. Callers of boot_init_stack_canary need to use this function attribute unless they're compiled with -fno-stack-protector, otherwise the canary stored in the stack slot of the caller will differ upon the call to boot_init_stack_canary. This will lead to a call to __stack_chk_fail() then panic.
No detection rules found.
No public exploits indexed.
2025-10-01
Published