cbcvebase.
CVE-2026-12046
published 2026-06-19

CVE-2026-12046: Two state-mutating endpoints in pgAdmin 4's SQL Editor blueprint -- DELETE /sqleditor/close/ and POST /sqleditor/initialize/sqleditor/update_connection/// --…

PriorityP266critical9CVSS 3.1
AVNACHPRNUINSCCHIHAH
EPSS
0.71%
49.1th percentile
Two state-mutating endpoints in pgAdmin 4's SQL Editor blueprint -- DELETE /sqleditor/close/ and POST /sqleditor/initialize/sqleditor/update_connection/// -- were the only routes in the module missing the @pga_login_required decorator. Both reach a pickle.loads sink on session['gridData'][]['command_obj']: the close endpoint via close_sqleditor_session(), and update_sqleditor_connection via check_transaction_status(). In server mode these endpoints were reachable without any authenticated pgAdmin session. The defect is a missing-authentication-on-critical-function (CWE-306) wrapper around a deserialization-of-untrusted-data sink (CWE-502). Exploiting it for remote code execution requires the attacker to also forge a server-side session file whose gridData entry contains a malicious pickle payload, which in turn requires both (a) knowledge of pgAdmin's Flask SECRET_KEY (no chain to leak it is described here -- the attacker must already possess it) and (b) write access to pgAdmin's sessions/ directory on the host. Neither precondition is granted by this defect on its own. When those preconditions are met from another channel (misconfigured deployment, prior compromise, leaked configuration), the missing auth gate is the final hop that turns an existing partial compromise into unauthenticated code execution in the pgAdmin process -- and, by extension, on the host under whatever account runs pgAdmin. Fix is a one-line @pga_login_required decorator on each of the two endpoints, matching the convention used by every other route in the module. The is_authenticated / MFA chain now runs before the trans_id is dereferenced, so an unauthenticated request is rejected before reaching the deserialization path. The defect is server-mode only. In DESKTOP mode pgAdmin's before_request hook re-authenticates DESKTOP_USER on every request, so no endpoint can be exercised in an unauthenticated state and no auth decorator (or its absence) is meaningful. The accompanying regression tes

Affected

1 ranges
VendorProductVersion rangeFixed in
pgadmin.orgpgadmin_4>= 6.9 < 9.169.16

Detection & IOCsextracted from sources · hover to see the quote

urlDELETE /sqleditor/close/<trans_id>
urlPOST /sqleditor/initialize/sqleditor/update_connection/<trans_id>/<int:sgid>/<int:sid>
cookieX-pgA-CSRFToken
pathsessions/
  • Alert on unauthenticated (no valid session cookie) HTTP DELETE requests to the /sqleditor/close/ endpoint in pgAdmin 4 server mode — this endpoint should require authentication and any unauthenticated hit is a direct indicator of exploitation attempt.
  • Alert on unauthenticated (no valid session cookie) HTTP POST requests to the /sqleditor/initialize/sqleditor/update_connection/ endpoint in pgAdmin 4 server mode — same missing-auth condition as the close endpoint.
  • Monitor for an attacker harvesting a CSRF token via GET /login immediately followed by unauthenticated requests to the two vulnerable sqleditor endpoints — this sequence mirrors the documented attacker path in the regression test.
  • Monitor for unexpected writes or modifications to the pgAdmin sessions/ directory, especially creation of session files containing binary/pickle-serialized data — this is a required precondition for the RCE chain.
  • This vulnerability is server-mode only; DESKTOP mode is not affected. Scope detection rules to pgAdmin deployments running in SERVER mode.
  • ·Exploitation requires the attacker to already possess the Flask SECRET_KEY. Without it, the malicious pickle session file cannot be forged. Detections focused solely on the unauthenticated endpoint calls may miss the full chain if the SECRET_KEY is not separately protected.
  • ·The vulnerability only affects pgAdmin 4 versions from 6.9 up to (but not including) 9.16. Deployments already on 9.16+ are patched and these detection rules are not needed for those instances.
  • ·Network-level mitigation (restricting access to the pgAdmin port to trusted hosts only) reduces exposure but does not patch the root cause; detection rules should still be applied for internal network traffic.

CVSS provenance

nvdv3.19.0CRITICALCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvdv4.09.5CRITICALCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
vendor_redhat9.0HIGH
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