CVE-2026-33336
published 2026-03-24CVE-2026-33336: Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.21.0 and prior to version 2.2.0, the Vikunja Desktop Electron wrapper…
PriorityP354high8.8CVSS 3.1
AVNACLPRNUIRSUCHIHAH
EPSS
1.11%
61.9th percentile
Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.21.0 and prior to version 2.2.0, the Vikunja Desktop Electron wrapper enables `nodeIntegration` in the main BrowserWindow and does not restrict same-window navigations. An attacker who can place a link in user-generated content (task descriptions, comments, project descriptions) can cause the BrowserWindow to navigate to an attacker-controlled origin, where JavaScript executes with full Node.js access, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.
## Root cause
Two misconfigurations combine to create this vulnerability:
1. **`nodeIntegration: true`** is set in `BrowserWindow` web preferences (`desktop/main.js:14-16`), giving any page loaded in the renderer full access to Node.js APIs (`require`, `child_process`, `fs`, etc.).
2. **No `will-navigate` or `will-redirect` handler** is registered on the `webContents`. The existing `setWindowOpenHandler` (`desktop/main.js:19-23`) only intercepts `window.open()` calls (new-window requests). It does **not** intercept same-window navigations triggered by:
- `` links (without `target="_blank"`)
- `window.location` assignments
- HTTP redirects
- `` tags
## Attack scenario
1. The attacker is a normal user on the same Vikunja instance (e.g., a member of a shared project).
2. The attacker creates or edits a project description or task description containing a standard HTML link, e.g.: `Click here for the updated design spec`
3. The Vikunja frontend renders this link. DOMPurify sanitization correctly allows it -- it is a legitimate anchor tag, not a script injection. Render path example: `frontend/src/views/project/ProjectInfo.vue` uses `v-html` with DOMPurify-sanitized output.
4. The victim uses Vikunja Desktop and clicks the link.
5. Because no `will-navigate` handler exists, the BrowserWindow navigates to `https://evil.example/exploit` in the same renderer process.
6. The attacker's page n
Affected
2 ranges
| Vendor | Product | Version range | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| go-vikunja | vikunja | — | — |
| vikunja | vikunja | >= 0.21.0 < 2.2.2 | 2.2.2 |
CVSS provenance
nvdv3.18.8HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvdv4.06.5MEDIUMCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
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No advisories linked to this vulnerability.
No detection rules found.
No public exploits indexed.
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2026-03-24
Published