CVE-2026-33480
published 2026-03-23CVE-2026-33480: WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the `isSSRFSafeURL()` function in AVideo can be bypassed using IPv4-mapped…
PriorityP354high8.6CVSS 3.1
AVNACLPRNUINSCCHINAN
EPSS
0.32%
23.7th percentile
WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the `isSSRFSafeURL()` function in AVideo can be bypassed using IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (`::ffff:x.x.x.x`). The unauthenticated `plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php` endpoint uses this function to validate URLs before fetching them with curl, but the IPv4-mapped IPv6 prefix passes all checks, allowing an attacker to access cloud metadata services, internal networks, and localhost services. Commit 75ce8a579a58c9d4c7aafe453fbced002cb8f373 contains a patch.
Affected
2 ranges
| Vendor | Product | Version range | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| wwbn | avideo | <= 26.0 | — |
| wwbn | avideo | 0 – 26.0 | — |
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GHSA
AVideo has a SSRF Protection Bypass via IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Addresses in Unauthenticated LiveLinks Proxy
ghsa·2026-03-20
CVE-2026-33480 [HIGH] CWE-918 AVideo has a SSRF Protection Bypass via IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Addresses in Unauthenticated LiveLinks Proxy
AVideo has a SSRF Protection Bypass via IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Addresses in Unauthenticated LiveLinks Proxy
## Summary
The `isSSRFSafeURL()` function in AVideo can be bypassed using IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (`::ffff:x.x.x.x`). The unauthenticated `plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php` endpoint uses this function to validate URLs before fetching them with curl, but the IPv4-mapped IPv6 prefix passes all checks, allowing an attacker to access cloud metadata services, internal networks, and localhost services.
## Details
The `isSSRFSafeURL()` function in `objects/functions.php` (lines 4021-4169) implements SSRF protection with two separate check paths:
1. **IPv4 checks** (lines 4101-4134): Regex patterns matching dotted-decimal notation (`/^10\./`, `/^172\./`, `/^192\.168\./`, `/^127\./`, `/^169\.254\
OSV
AVideo has a SSRF Protection Bypass via IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Addresses in Unauthenticated LiveLinks Proxy
osv·2026-03-20
CVE-2026-33480 [HIGH] AVideo has a SSRF Protection Bypass via IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Addresses in Unauthenticated LiveLinks Proxy
AVideo has a SSRF Protection Bypass via IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Addresses in Unauthenticated LiveLinks Proxy
## Summary
The `isSSRFSafeURL()` function in AVideo can be bypassed using IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (`::ffff:x.x.x.x`). The unauthenticated `plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php` endpoint uses this function to validate URLs before fetching them with curl, but the IPv4-mapped IPv6 prefix passes all checks, allowing an attacker to access cloud metadata services, internal networks, and localhost services.
## Details
The `isSSRFSafeURL()` function in `objects/functions.php` (lines 4021-4169) implements SSRF protection with two separate check paths:
1. **IPv4 checks** (lines 4101-4134): Regex patterns matching dotted-decimal notation (`/^10\./`, `/^172\./`, `/^192\.168\./`, `/^127\./`, `/^169\.254\
No detection rules found.
No public exploits indexed.
2026-03-23
Published