CVE-2026-34046
published 2026-03-27CVE-2026-34046: Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.5.1, the `_read_flow` helper in…
PriorityP357high8.8CVSS 3.1
AVNACLPRLUINSUCHIHAH
EPSS
0.41%
32.4th percentile
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.5.1, the `_read_flow` helper in `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/flows.py` branched on the `AUTO_LOGIN` setting to decide whether to filter by `user_id`. When `AUTO_LOGIN` was `False` (i.e., authentication was enabled), neither branch enforced an ownership check — the query returned any flow matching the given UUID regardless of who owned it. This allowed any authenticated user to read any other user's flow, including embedded plaintext API keys; modify the logic of another user's AI agents, and/or delete flows belonging to other users. The vulnerability was introduced by the conditional logic that was meant to accommodate public/example flows (those with `user_id = NULL`) under auto-login mode, but inadvertently left the authenticated path without an ownership filter. The fix in version 1.5.1 removes the `AUTO_LOGIN` conditional entirely and unconditionally scopes the query to the requesting user.
Affected
7 ranges
| Vendor | Product | Version range | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| langflow-ai | langflow | < 1.5.1 | 1.5.1 |
| langflow-ai | langflow-base | < 0.5.1 | 0.5.1 |
| langflow-ai | langflow-base | >= 0 < 0.5.1 | 0.5.1 |
| langflow | langflow | < 1.5.0 | 1.5.0 |
| langflow | langflow | — | — |
| langflow | langflow | >= 0 < 1.5.1 | 1.5.1 |
| langflow | langflow-base | < 0.5.1 | 0.5.1 |
CVSS provenance
nvdv3.18.8HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvdv4.08.7HIGHCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
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GHSA
Langflow: Authenticated Users Can Read, Modify, and Delete Any Flow via Missing Ownership Check
ghsa·2026-03-27
CVE-2026-34046 [HIGH] CWE-639 Langflow: Authenticated Users Can Read, Modify, and Delete Any Flow via Missing Ownership Check
Langflow: Authenticated Users Can Read, Modify, and Delete Any Flow via Missing Ownership Check
## Vulnerability
### IDOR in `GET/PATCH/DELETE /api/v1/flow/{flow_id}`
The `_read_flow` helper in `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/flows.py` branched on the `AUTO_LOGIN` setting to decide whether to filter by `user_id`. When `AUTO_LOGIN` was `False` (i.e., authentication was enabled), neither branch enforced an ownership check — the query returned any flow matching the given UUID regardless of who owned it.
This exposed any authenticated user to:
- **Read** any other user's flow, including embedded plaintext API keys
- **Modify** the logic of another user's AI agents
- **Delete** flows belonging to other users
The vulnerability was introduced by the conditional logic that was meant to acc
OSV
Langflow: Authenticated Users Can Read, Modify, and Delete Any Flow via Missing Ownership Check
osv·2026-03-27
CVE-2026-34046 [HIGH] Langflow: Authenticated Users Can Read, Modify, and Delete Any Flow via Missing Ownership Check
Langflow: Authenticated Users Can Read, Modify, and Delete Any Flow via Missing Ownership Check
## Vulnerability
### IDOR in `GET/PATCH/DELETE /api/v1/flow/{flow_id}`
The `_read_flow` helper in `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/flows.py` branched on the `AUTO_LOGIN` setting to decide whether to filter by `user_id`. When `AUTO_LOGIN` was `False` (i.e., authentication was enabled), neither branch enforced an ownership check — the query returned any flow matching the given UUID regardless of who owned it.
This exposed any authenticated user to:
- **Read** any other user's flow, including embedded plaintext API keys
- **Modify** the logic of another user's AI agents
- **Delete** flows belonging to other users
The vulnerability was introduced by the conditional logic that was meant to acc
No detection rules found.
No public exploits indexed.
2026-03-27
Published