CVE-2026-43866
published 2026-07-06CVE-2026-43866: Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel, Apache Camel JMS component. JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() in camel-jms - and the equivalent…
PriorityP351high7.3CVSS 3.1
AVNACLPRNUINSUCLILAL
EPSS
0.50%
40.1th percentile
Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel, Apache Camel JMS component.
JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() in camel-jms - and the equivalent JmsBinding in camel-sjms - deserializes the payload of an incoming JMS ObjectMessage via jakarta.jms.ObjectMessage.getObject() whenever the mapJmsMessage option is enabled (the default) and Camel acts as a JMS consumer. The CVE-2026-40860 hardening added a post-deserialization class check that rejects classes outside the default allow-list java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*. However org.apache.camel.support.DefaultExchangeHolder itself lives in the allow-listed org.apache.camel.** namespace, so an ObjectMessage whose top-level object is a DefaultExchangeHolder passes the check. The receiving side then calls DefaultExchangeHolder.unmarshal() on it without requiring the transferExchange option to be enabled - an asymmetric trust boundary, since the sending side gates ObjectMessage and transferExchange handling but the receiving side did not - writing every non-null field of the holder into the Exchange: the message body, the IN and OUT headers, the exchange properties, the variables, the exchange id and the exception. An attacker who can publish an ObjectMessage to a queue or topic consumed by an affected Camel application can therefore inject arbitrary Exchange state using only universally-trusted java.lang and java.util types, with no deserialization gadget chain required, to manipulate routing and headers, exchange properties and error handling. The same handling applies to camel-sjms and camel-sjms2, and to the JMS-family components built on JmsComponent and JmsBinding: camel-amqp, camel-activemq and camel-activemq6. This is a bypass of the CVE-2026-40860 fix rather than a flaw in it.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 3.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0; Apache Camel: from 3.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.
Users are rec
Affected
3 ranges
| Vendor | Product | Version range | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| apache | camel | >= 3.0.0 < 4.14.8 | 4.14.8 |
| apache | camel | >= 4.15.0 < 4.18.3 | 4.18.3 |
| apache | camel | >= 4.19.0 < 4.21.0 | 4.21.0 |
CVSS provenance
nvdv3.17.3HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
vendor_redhat9.8CRITICAL
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Red Hat
camel-jms: Apache Camel JMS components: Arbitrary Exchange state injection
vendor_redhat·2026-07-06·CVSS 9.8
CVE-2026-43866 [CRITICAL] CWE-502 camel-jms: Apache Camel JMS components: Arbitrary Exchange state injection
camel-jms: Apache Camel JMS components: Arbitrary Exchange state injection
Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel, Apache Camel JMS component.
JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() in camel-jms - and the equivalent JmsBinding in camel-sjms - deserializes the payload of an incoming JMS ObjectMessage via jakarta.jms.ObjectMessage.getObject() whenever the mapJmsMessage option is enabled (the default) and Camel acts as a JMS consumer. The CVE-2026-40860 hardening added a post-deserialization class check that rejects classes outside the default allow-list java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*. However org.apache.camel.support.DefaultExchangeHolder itself lives in the allow-listed org.apache.camel.** namespace, so an ObjectMessage whose top-level object is a DefaultExchange
VulDB
Apache Camel up to 4.14.7/4.18.2/4.20.x DefaultExchangeHolder deserialization
vuldb·2026-07-08·CVSS 7.3
CVE-2026-43866 [HIGH] Apache Camel up to 4.14.7/4.18.2/4.20.x DefaultExchangeHolder deserialization
A vulnerability has been found in Apache Camel up to 4.14.7/4.18.2/4.20.x and classified as critical. This issue affects some unknown processing of the component DefaultExchangeHolder. Performing a manipulation results in deserialization.
This vulnerability was named CVE-2026-43866. The attack may be initiated remotely. There is no available exploit.
The affected component should be upgraded.
GHSA
Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel, Apache Camel JMS component.
ghsa_unreviewed·2026-07-06·CVSS 9.8
CVE-2026-43866 [CRITICAL] CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel, Apache Camel JMS component.
Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel, Apache Camel JMS component.
JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() in camel-jms - and the equivalent JmsBinding in camel-sjms - deserializes the payload of an incoming JMS ObjectMessage via jakarta.jms.ObjectMessage.getObject() whenever the mapJmsMessage option is enabled (the default) and Camel acts as a JMS consumer. The CVE-2026-40860 hardening added a post-deserialization class check that rejects classes outside the default allow-list java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*. However org.apache.camel.support.DefaultExchangeHolder itself lives in the allow-listed org.apache.camel.** namespace, so an ObjectMessage whose top-level object is a DefaultExchangeHolder passes the check. The receiving side then calls DefaultExchangeHolde
No detection rules found.
No public exploits indexed.
2026-07-06
Published