CVE-2026-43884
published 2026-05-11CVE-2026-43884: WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 29.0, two endpoints (plugin/AI/receiveAsync.json.php and objects/EpgParser.php)…
PriorityP345high7.7CVSS 3.1
AVNACLPRLUINSCCHINAN
EPSS
0.35%
26.6th percentile
WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 29.0, two endpoints (plugin/AI/receiveAsync.json.php and objects/EpgParser.php) in AVideo call isSSRFSafeURL() to validate user-supplied URLs, then fetch them using bare file_get_contents() without disabling PHP's automatic redirect following. An attacker can supply a URL pointing to a server they control that returns a 302 redirect to an internal/cloud-metadata address (e.g., http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/). Since isSSRFSafeURL() only validates the initial URL, the redirect target bypasses all SSRF protections. Commit 603e7bf77a835584387327e35560262feb075db3 contains an updated fix.
Affected
2 ranges
| Vendor | Product | Version range | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| wwbn | avideo | <= 29.0 | — |
| wwbn | avideo | 0 – 29.0 | — |
CVSS provenance
nvdv3.17.7HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
ghsa7.7HIGH
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GHSA
AVideo CVE-2026-43884 incomplete fix - six (or more) `isSSRFSafeURL()` call sites still discard the `$resolvedIP` out-param at master HEAD post-`603e7bf`
ghsa·2026-05-15·CVSS 7.7
CVE-2026-45619 [HIGH] CWE-367 AVideo CVE-2026-43884 incomplete fix - six (or more) `isSSRFSafeURL()` call sites still discard the `$resolvedIP` out-param at master HEAD post-`603e7bf`
AVideo CVE-2026-43884 incomplete fix - six (or more) `isSSRFSafeURL()` call sites still discard the `$resolvedIP` out-param at master HEAD post-`603e7bf`
CVE-2026-43884 fix `603e7bf` patched `EpgParser.php` and `plugin/AI/receiveAsync.json.php` to use `url_get_contents` (redirect-safe). Neither uses the `$resolvedIP` out-param of `isSSRFSafeURL()` for DNS pinning via `CURLOPT_RESOLVE`. Six+ other call sites still discard `$resolvedIP`, opening DNS-rebinding TOCTOU.
Reference correct pattern at `plugin/YPTWallet/YPTWallet.php:1071-1098`:
```php
$resolvedIP = null;
if (isSSRFSafeURL($url, $resolvedIP)) {
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RESOLVE, ["$h
GHSA
AVideo has SSRF Protection Bypass via HTTP Redirect and DNS Rebinding in isSSRFSafeURL()
ghsa·2026-05-05
CVE-2026-43884 [HIGH] CWE-918 AVideo has SSRF Protection Bypass via HTTP Redirect and DNS Rebinding in isSSRFSafeURL()
AVideo has SSRF Protection Bypass via HTTP Redirect and DNS Rebinding in isSSRFSafeURL()
### Summary
Two endpoints in AVideo call `isSSRFSafeURL()` to validate user-supplied URLs, then fetch them using bare `file_get_contents()` **without disabling PHP's automatic redirect following**. An attacker can supply a URL pointing to a server they control that returns a 302 redirect to an internal/cloud-metadata address (e.g., `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`). Since `isSSRFSafeURL()` only validates the *initial* URL, the redirect target bypasses all SSRF protections.
A secondary finding is that 6+ callers of `isSSRFSafeURL()` discard the `$resolvedIP` out-parameter meant for DNS pinning, leaving them vulnerable to DNS rebinding TOCTOU attacks.
**Severity:** High — CVSS 3.1: 7.7 (AV:
No detection rules found.
No public exploits indexed.
No writeups or analysis indexed.
2026-05-11
Published